ABSTRACT
In the introduction to Markets, Constitutions, and Inequality we posited that contemporary constitutions ‘embed’ markets by establishing certain institutions that foster their development. Examples of this include constitutional protection of private property, or the specific rules regarding fiscal expenditure or monetary policy. The embeddedness of these institutions places them above and beyond ordinary political processes. However, as the essays that make this contribution demonstrate, the relationship between constitutions, markets, and inequality may be more complex than initially considered. In their own context, constitutions may have been regarded as mechanisms to address certain inequalities, not to further them; moreover, the question of whether the problem is more one of constitutional effectiveness, rather than constitutional design, is an issue that merits further analysis. It may be the case that there is no consensus as to which market-related institutions can or should be ‘embedded’ in constitutions, or whether constitutions can actually ‘fix’ other embedded institutions over time. In this Afterword, we offer some final reflections on the contributions made by the authors, and we conclude by pointing to further developments that can be useful for advancing the research enquiries at the heart of this collection.
