ABSTRACT
The chapter analyzes the apparent difficulties inherent in the integration of an analysis of constitutions within neoclassical economics. This is achieved by reviewing and comparing the work of four protagonists of the debates: Buchanan, Commons, North, and Posner. While not ideologically averse to neoclassical theory, in the process of theorizing constitutions, each of these authors would end up criticizing, wholly or partly, the neoclassical framework. The chapter illustrates how, despite the significant epistemological, methodological, and ideological differences, all these authors struggle to reconcile neoclassical economics and the normative dimension of constitutions, which figures prominently throughout all four contributions, although in different declinations. It is therefore argued that the normative nature of both constitution and constitutional analysis may be incompatible with the positive and amoral framework of neoclassical economics; the latter may still provide support for purely empirical approaches to the economic analysis of constitutions. However, an economic theory of constitutions appears to belong to the heterodox field.
