ABSTRACT
In recent years, some ethicists have defended that we should genetically engineer farmed animals to diminish or eliminate their capacity to experience negative affective states, a process known as disenhancement that would allegedly result in a situation that is better than the status quo. While Monsó and Hintze agree with this overall assessment, they believe that it is a mistake to defend disenhancement as a good solution to farmed animals’ plight. This is because disenhancement entails some generally unseen harms that arise from the fact that negative affective states, despite feeling bad, support access to a number of intrinsic goods, such as individuality, social relationships, meaning, and political participation. Though farmed animals currently have few opportunities to enjoy these goods, Monsó and Hintze argue that this is a reason to change the environment in which they are kept, not the animals. As it is argued in this chapter, if we truly care about improving farmed animals’ lives, we should aim to enrich their environment, rather than impoverish their mental lives.
