ABSTRACT
For the most part contemporary moral theorists have taken for granted a uniformity of norm-subjects, and have attended to the logic of moral language operating under the unquestioned assumption that moral subjects are in the requisite respects alike. When the uniformity postulate is presented as a factual claim, however, moral philosophy itself presents two all-too-common facts suggesting that the requisite uniformity is not available to support the having in ethics of rules meant for everyone. In the sciences of Man and in the presuppositions of History there is some reliance on a principle of uniformity of human nature. Systematically acting on no principle at all is inimical to community, amity and cooperation because it maximizes the disuniformity factor, and uniformity is a condition of community. It is precisely in the respect that the moral point of view aims at community and amity that uniformity may be said to be a desideratum of ethics.
