ABSTRACT
The concept of virtue, together with that of good and that of obligation are the Big Three in the history of ethics. The basic starting-points for the analysis of virtue are to be found on the one hand—the moralcode side—in the veritable parade of virtues on the face of human social history; on the other hand—the theoretical or, the metaethical side—in the diversity of philosophical treatments of the concept. In general, teleological philosophies look to virtues as the ordered dispositions or states of character which will enable the human being to achieve the good. Aristotle analyzing virtue into its genus and differentia in order to furnish a formal definition locates the genus as state of character. The chapter discusses the concept of virtue as a case study because its theoretical eclipse is itself an interesting phenomenon, because its psychological presuppositions are closer to the surface, and because there is some tendency in philosophical circles to revive the concept.
