ABSTRACT
Compared to the Quad, the ‘Quad Plus’—the Quad extended to New Zealand, South Korea, Brazil, Israel and Vietnam—could better fit ASEAN. The new group is more aligned with ASEAN interests and principles—broader coverage, more inclusive, and more flexible. While the Quad is perceived as a counterweight to China, the Quad Plus appears more a crisis-responding initiative and thus better engages with ASEAN. It will also enhance ASEAN’s posture against Chinese maritime aggressiveness without involving great power competition as with the Quad. Nevertheless, ASEAN may be wary about forging closer relations with the Quad Plus due to potential Chinese pressure and the dilution of ASEAN centrality, particularly amid growing US-Sino tension. This chapter argues that ASEAN could address those concerns and better benefit from the Quad Plus by leveraging India-Japan-ASEAN trilateral cooperation, taking advantage of post-COVID global dynamics, and boosting its existing links with Quad Plus members.
