ABSTRACT
For the trading of claims to work properly, it requires well-established cross-border infrastructures. A crucial part is payment systems. The emergence of financialization in the 1970s went hand-in-hand with the establishment of the SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) association. During the last two decades, the Belgium/US-based SWIFT has established itself as a near monopoly for the processing of transactions.
More recently, however, this monopoly has been challenged by some large emerging markets. In March 2019, the Russian Parliament has approved the use of the Bank of Russia’s SPFS (System for Transfer of Financial Messages) for cross-border use. Iran, Venezuela and Turkey are interested in using the system. Already in 2015, China had launched its CIPS (China International Payments System), with strongly increasing transactions during the last couple of years. SWIFT sanctions in the Ukraine war have given new impetus to these initiatives.
The existence of a well-working alternative global payment system would not by itself put limits on the trading of claims. However, the strong degree of state influence in the state capitalist financial systems of China and Russia would make it easier for the state to intervene into cross-border payments, to the detriment of the importance of liberal financial market considerations.
