ABSTRACT
Many strategic analysts fear that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could widen the rift between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states by stigmatising the nuclear-weapon possessors rather than the weapons. The pertinent questions are therefore how to translate the normative pressure that the treaty poses into something more substantive? Can some measures be identified for the nuclear-weapon states to take, and for the non-nuclear-weapon states to encourage them into taking, to promote its objectives? Can bridges be built between the positions of nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states; and between adversarial nuclear rivals? This chapter argues that the pathway to elimination is as important as the process of elimination itself. It suggests a nuclear restraint regime that addresses many dimensions of nuclear weapons deployment: their role, targets, force postures, types and numbers, and also the circumstances in which they are employed. Each restraint would circumscribe the role of nuclear weapons, and as the circle of their utility becomes smaller, eventual elimination will become possible.
