ABSTRACT
The greatest challenge facing the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is to convince nuclear-armed states to become parties to the treaty, and then to engage in good-faith efforts aimed at peace, stability and the eventual elimination of their nuclear weapons. Given the initial responses of the nuclear-armed states to the TPNW, the parties must hope to create a different climate, in part by designing a verification system to satisfy all parties, while providing value to the nuclear-armed states. The verification system will play a crucial role in decisions by nuclear-armed states to sign the treaty, how they participate and the steps they are prepared to accept leading eventually to the elimination of all of their nuclear weapons. The anticipated role of the TPNW verification system in the emerging international nuclear disarmament regime will determine whether or not the treaty will be successful in addressing the risks posed by nuclear weapons and in achieving progress on nuclear disarmament. The creation of a new verification authority responsible only to the TPNW parties to address the elimination of the existing arsenals would complement the verification missions assigned to the International Atomic Energy Agency in the text of the treaty.
