ABSTRACT
In this chapter, I discuss two solutions to the Problem of Universals which are based on the notion of metaphysical grounding, viz. priority and grounding nominalism. In the first section, I present the four many formulations of the Problem. In the second section, I briefly introduce ostrich nominalism and the notion of metaphysical grounding. This is important because both priority and grounding nominalism claim, like ostrich nominalism, that first-order predicative facts are fundamental and justify this claim in terms of grounding. In the third section, I explain why first-order facts should be considered fundamental. In the fourth section, I deal with the One over Many argument and show why, according to priority nominalism, universals do not exist. Finally, in the fifth section, priority and grounding nominalism will be compared and evaluated. This is the main difference: while priority nominalism rejects the existence of universals, grounding nominalism accepts their existence as merely derivative.
