ABSTRACT
It is tempting to see recent work on dispositions as a debate between two clearly delineated camps, neo-Humeans who continue to seek reductive analyses of dispositional properties, and neo-Aristotelians who embrace dispositions as a fundamental part of their ontology. However, the situation is more complicated. There are various motives and methods for reducing dispositional properties. Furthermore, there is no comprehensive “dispositions metaphysic” that all dispositions theorists share. Believing that there are dispositions leaves many unanswered questions and topics for debate. I pose some of those questions and explore the range of answers that philosophers have defended in recent literature. These questions include: “What are dispositions?”; “With respect to debates about dispositions, what kinds of properties are there?”; and “Are dispositions reducible?”. I close by mentioning further unsettled questions and concluding that there is much room for disagreement among dispositional realists.
