ABSTRACT
The topic of this chapter is the Worlds are Structural Properties theory, WASP, obtained by adapting David Lewis’ Modal Realism in two ways: (1) replace possible worlds understood as complex particulars by world-structures understood as structural properties, and (2) abandon his problematic token-reflexive theory of actuality in favour of the thesis that all instances are actual. As a first approximation, we might say that possible worlds are just world-structures and that to be actual is to have an instance. I present two versions of the theory, Uni-WASP and Trope-WASP, in which properties are respectively universals and particulars, and pose some problems for WASP, notably that of Infinite Worlds, that of Structural Properties, and the Ockhamist case against Strong Platonism. In the conclusion, I list the problematic theses on which various WASPers might have to rely, leaving readers to judge whether that amounts to a refutation.
