ABSTRACT
In philosophy, a paraphrase can either be a less misleading restatement of something one thinks is true (a reconciling paraphrase), or a replacement statement for something one thinks is merely almost true (a revising paraphrase). Paraphrase is relevant to the existence of properties because there are apparently true claims that apparently entail the existence of properties. This gives us good reason to think there are properties, unless it can be plausibly argued that at least one of those appearances is misleading. Reconciling paraphrists will grant that the apparently true claims are, in fact, true, but argue that their apparent entailments are merely apparent. Conversely, revising paraphrists will grant that the apparent entailments actually hold, but argue that the apparently true claims are only almost true, and that the nearby truths they should be replaced with lack those entailments. This chapter elucidates the requirements for successful reconciling and revising paraphrases.
