ABSTRACT
This chapter presents the metaethical discussion of moral properties with emphasis on the connection between metaphysical views on properties and theories on moral properties. Theories on moral properties vary along three dimensions: realism vs. anti-realism, naturalism vs. non-naturalism, and reductionism vs. non-reductionism. It is argued that realism should be understood in terms of specific mind independence which entails that moral properties are not arbitrarily dependent on the mental states of individual agents. It is further noticed that theories on moral properties should account for the practicality of morality. This chapter then considers different versions of naturalism and non-naturalism in reductionist and non-reductionist forms. It is discussed how these theories account for the practicality of morality and what metaphysical challenges they face. Moreover, it is suggested that specific mind independence offers plausible classifications of metaethical theories as ‘realist’ or ‘anti-realist’.
