ABSTRACT
The topic of values in economics has a long history. According to already established narratives, the view of economics as a value-free science was solidified by the neoclassical school that defined economics as a positive science free from any value judgements. However, some philosophers of economics and historians of economic thought teach us that debates about the role of value judgements in economics, as well as the division of economics into positive and normative branches, were much richer and more ambiguous than what the standard narrative might suggest. This chapter does not intend to contribute further to these debates. Instead, its aim is to draw readers’ attention to yet another take on values in economics that has become present in philosophy of economics. The chapter reviews current attempts to bring insights from philosophy of science on how to analyse values in science to economic methodology. First, it reflects on whether these insights shed new light on discussions about the positive and the normative in economics. Second, it shows that they allow us to approach theoretical discussions on so-called rational choice theory from a novel and illuminating angle. The chapter concludes by listing the main lessons that can be learnt from the vibrant debates on values in science in philosophy of science.
