ABSTRACT
The idea that theology and science can provide conjunctive explanations for physical phenomena makes several theological assumptions that some will find troublesome. Aside from (certainly valid) concerns about the conservation of energy or the interaction problem which challenge the idea that God could act as a cause within the material universe, there are also difficulties with the “sort” of God that conjunctive explanations apparently assumes. Drawing on the theology of Paul Tillich and scholastic ideas about “causality” and “creation,” this chapter will argue that there are significant problems with a theory of conjunctive explanations if it allows God to be considered a cause in exactly the same way as other causes. The chapter will argue that a nuanced and reinterpreted version of NOMA is to be preferred, one in which physical causes and metaphysical causes are kept apart. In this way, theology is not reduced to ethical questions, but instead is directed to ontological questions of how and why the universe has being to begin with, not what happens to the universe once it has being.
