ABSTRACT
This chapter argues that the NIEs on the ballistic missile threat of the 1990s offer a useful analogy. The estimating process starts with an NIE request from the executive branch, Congress, or military commander. NIEs are not as old as the intelligence community itself. The decision to produce NIEs resulted from what was seen as the egregious failure to anticipate North Korea’s 1950 invasion of the South. One of the first significant NIEs to follow the end of the Cold War was an estimate of the ballistic missile threat from states other than the Soviet Union. In a more recent case, the NIEs on Iran over a similarly short period of time – 2005 to 2007 – also appeared to mark a sharp contrast between estimates, and an equally acrimonious political debate and policy shift ensued. It suggests what may be uncovered if critics are successful in establishing a national commission to study the recent Iran NIE’s ‘about-face’.
