ABSTRACT
This chapter employs the analytical concept of the “hurting stalemate,” articulated by conflict resolution scholar I. William Zartman, to address the Syrian civil war from 2011 to 2015. The chapter first examines the Syrian state’s military on the eve of the civil war and how its fortunes stalled by 2015. The second section examines how this stalemate was ultimately overcome by the decisive role played by Russia’s military intervention in that year. A quantitative and qualitative study of the military imbalance between the Syrian government and insurgents demonstrates its role in the state’s survival up to its stalemate in 2015. The predictions of the Syrian state’s collapse as late as 2015 can be attributed to mistaking its misfortunes as a sign of imminent collapse, opposed to the conflict having reached a stalemate. By 2015, the state could not go on the offensive and retake lost territory, but no one insurgent faction could overthrow the state by marching onto the capital, providing the opportune timing for Russia to intervene and turn the tide for Bashar al-Asad.
