ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the conception of skepticism as a truth-seeking practice in the Pyrrhonists and Diderot from the perspective of what has been called “regulative epistemology.” In contrast to standard analytic epistemological approaches, regulative epistemology focuses on the ethics of investigation and belief, as well as on virtues and vices associated with these intellectual practices. It will be suggested that Pyrrhonian skeptics and Diderot can help us address central questions concerning skepticism in regulative epistemology. This chapter will reconstruct the Pyrrhonists’ and Diderot’s conceptions of skepticism and of the skeptic. Both conceive of skepticism as a practice that is essential to pursue excellence in investigation because it enables the inquirer to avoid and combat the intellectual vice of dogmatism. Drawing on Diderot’s criticism of the Pyrrhonists, it can be argued that skepticism as a truth-seeking practice is not always virtuous, but there may be some vicious applications of it. Diderot’s virtue/ vice account of skepticism is interesting from the perspective of regulative epistemology because it allows us to see that not all skeptics are equally excellent truth seekers and that certain virtuous character traits, especially intellectual integrity, are required to perform the skeptical practice optimally.
