ABSTRACT
Quite surprisingly, the issue of political accountability in relation to the European Union system is little studied by French and foreign constitutionalists and the Europeanist doctrine, although it fascinates the observers of democracy in domestic parliamentary systems. This is probably due to the originality and complexity of the European institutional system, or even to the lasting impression that the European model is too different from those of national parliamentarianism. That issue is nonetheless just as topical as ever. Indeed, the European system is completely different from ‘Communities’ of old. Though the distinction between powers was blurred for a long time, and there was some ‘appearance of diffused and permanent negotiation between scattered and ill-identified interests’ 1 which went against the representative principle, time has passed. Democracy has spread, powers and interests are better identified, if only because, since the Lisbon Treaty, 2 the composition of the official Executive (the European Commission) has been linked to the results of the European legislative elections.
