ABSTRACT
In this chapter, I argue against analyzing rape as, simply, sex minus consent, or nonconsensual sex. Given the role of consent in rape law, the recent proliferation of philosophical work on sex and consent is timely and important, since, within that framework, we need to figure out what should count as consent and when consent is vitiated by fraud or other factors. Did x rape y on occasion z? is the question for fact finders in a criminal rape trial and, in that context, determining whether the alleged victim consented to the act(s) in question is of critical importance. However, if our goals in analyzing rape are, first, to understand how rape harms its direct and its indirect victims and, second, to eradicate rape, or at least change the culture so that rape is less prevalent, the question “Did y consent to x’s doing Φ on occasion z?” is not a very useful question to ask and focusing on it exclusively is counterproductive. We can make the most progress toward achieving both these goals by viewing rape as a pervasive, politically significant phenomenon arising from, exacerbating, and perpetuating gender-, race-, and other group-based inequalities.
