ABSTRACT
Henry of Ghent opposes an account of incontinence according to which disordered willing presupposes disordered cognition, from fear that moral evil would come down to a mere mistake or miscalculation. He asserts that those who argue for such an account – presumably he means Godfrey of Fontaines – are following Aristotle rather than Scripture as explained by the saints (i.e., Augustine). In Henry’s view, the will can become evil while one’s particular practical judgement that this act is to be avoided is correct. John of Pouilly, a student of Godfrey of Fontaines, denies that one can act contrary to one’s practical judgement while this judgement is upheld. He argues against Henry that “the saints” – Augustine, Anselm of Canterbury, and Bernard of Clairvaux – are in agreement with Aristotle. Pouilly cleverly formulates some of their accounts of reluctant evil action, such as lying to save one’s life, in the form of a practical syllogism to show that they explain such action in the same way as he takes Aristotle to explain incontinent action in Nicomachean Ethics 7.3. The debate between Pouilly and Henry thus illustrates a fundamental disagreement about the connection between cognition and volition, and between deficient cognition and evil volition.
