ABSTRACT
That Adam Smith held the virtue of self-command in high regard is well appreciated today. Less well understood is just why Smith held self-command in such high regard, especially in light of his identification of self-command as a virtue characteristic of “rude and barbarous nations.” What follows is the argument that Smith’s interest in self-command derives from his recognition of its unique capacity to further three core aspects of his ethical project: utility, dignity, and sympathy. First, self-command plays an indispensable role in promoting the individual’s self-interested efforts to maximize her utility with regard to wealth and esteem. Second, Smith values self-command not only for instrumental reasons, but also because it offers opportunities to exercise our capacities as dignified beings and realize our authentic selves. Third, Smith values self-command for its capacity to support the bonds of a modern liberal society built on sympathy and dedicated to equality. In this sense, self-command not only promotes individual well-being but also plays a specifically social and political role.
