ABSTRACT
Kant is deeply concerned about the threat determinism may pose to human freedom. His attempt to reconcile freedom with a deterministic view of nature in the Critique of Pure Reason is well-known. This chapter, however, deals with a different kind of deterministic threat that Kant discusses in the Critique of Practical Reason , and which Brewer and Watkins have labeled “theological determinism.” This is the doctrine that all determinations of things, including our actions, are fully determined by God. In light of this doctrine, how can human beings have a robust ability to do otherwise? Kant appeals to transcendental idealism to answer this question; it is far from clear, however, how this appeal can resolve the issue. This chapter suggests a new way of understanding Kant’s response and argues that it turns on his denial of the so-called “Principle of Complete Determination” for the realm of things in themselves. This allows him to avoid the conclusion that God creates our noumenal selves as fully determinate, which in turn means that self-determination is possible.
