ABSTRACT
In this conceptual and theoretical chapter from the perspective of sport economics, the authors ask whether organising premier-level European football should be a monopoly, and who should be in charge. In their attempt to locate the scope for a necessary monopoly, the two economists discuss the merits and shortcomings of the established European pyramidal model of sports governance. In economics, monopolies are associated with severe consumer (fan) welfare loss and massive dynamic inefficiencies. Therefore, effective competition in every market is the generally preferred organisation of commercial activities and, subsequently, the main goal of competition law and policy. Yet they also find that there may be situations where a single supplier of a good may exceptionally be superior to competition. Organising premier-level sports is often viewed to be such an exception, they argue, as in the EU with the pyramid structure of sports associations governing professional (and commercial) sports. The authors revisit this assertion from a modern economics perspective, looking for economic arguments in favour of the pyramid structure, counter-arguments as well the potential for balancing the two. For the identified monopoly areas, they ask who should run them in order to maximise social and consumer (fan) welfare, suggesting that regular competitions for the market such as tender procedures for regulatory packages could be implemented, so that different suppliers can offer their service. Based on transparent criteria, this would allow the best to get their trial for a defined number of seasons.
