ABSTRACT
This chapter’s main objective is to explore the meanings of Plato’s notions of chance (tychē), necessity (anankē), and demiurgic cause as employed in the Timaeus, while occasionally referring to other dialogues as well. An attempt is made here to demonstrate that they – as far as their cosmologically relevant conceptual sides are concerned – approximate progressively one another, to the effect that chance, in one of its aspects, ultimately becomes identifiable with necessity, and necessity, in yet another of its semantic features, may be associated with the principal cause of the Timaeus. More precisely, the analysis embarked upon here aspires to show (1) that the Timaean tychē, in its pertinent cosmological sense, is related to a cause that produces necessary but purposeless effects; (2) that Plato in the Timaeus explicates the material causal necessity known from the Presocratics and named anankē, which is ultimately identifiable with tychē; and (3) that Plato in the same dialogue also implicitly evokes a different, novel kind of teleological anankē, embodied in the figure and the exploits of the Demiurge, who is a nous characterized by goal-directed, efficient causal powers that actively strives for the best and represents the prime necessity of the unfolding of the creation.
