ABSTRACT
Anyone interested in politics has, at one time or another, despaired at the lack of progress that we seem to make toward a more just, equitable, or peaceful society. Such despair, and the cynicism that accompanies it, most frequently arises from observing recurrent obstacles to progress such as racism, religious violence, or the inherent selfishness and greed of human beings – hindrances that recur so often they can make the political task seem downright Sisyphean. A central assumption behind the idea that political progress is possible is that we know where we should be heading. From a comprehensive perspective, that is not too hard – we head toward the horizon of justice. The hard part is knowing the details of the way. That, it seems, is very difficult indeed. So difficult that some think we should acknowledge it is impossible. That is, we are incapable of knowing what is true in politics. Call this view political skepticism. In this chapter, I review several lines of skeptical argument for political skepticism, aiming to show that one of them – concerning the reality of a conceptual corruption often called epistemic colonization – is far more plausible than the others. I conclude by offering some thoughts on how this skeptical threat, while profound, should motivate us not toward quietism but a more vigorous and inclusive democratic politics.
