ABSTRACT
No thesis is dismissed more routinely or more swiftly than ‘All that there is to knowing is one’s having a true or accurate belief’. That thesis is knowledge-minimalism, since traditional attempts to understand the nature of knowing have focused on adding some description to ‘having a true or accurate belief’. And this chapter joins the very few other attempts that have been made to defend knowledge-minimalism. The emphasis is metaphysical: the essence of knowledge is a true belief. Or so it is, if knowing must include having a belief at all. This chapter considers also how we might embrace knowledge-practicalism within our picture of knowing’s nature. On this further approach, all knowledge is knowledge-how, and the skills or abilities present as part of having some particular knowledge might, or might not, happen to include believing. It is possible to know without believing. And it is possible to know without doing anything more than believing – believing accurately, at least.
