ABSTRACT
In this chapter we explore the dynamics of the Russian approach to the nations of the post-Soviet Eurasia. We show that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s claims for regional leadership seemed reasonable and the strategy of ‘soft dominance’ that implied the use of a combination of economic concessions and sanctions to limit Western influence in the post-Soviet countries as well as launching integration projects, did have some chance of developing into genuine regional leadership. This strategy has failed to maintain Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet region that has been steadily declining. However, the default view was that the invariability of interstate borders was a threshold that Russia would not cross. With the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and invading Ukraine in 2022 Russia did cross this threshold. We conclude that the common past, economic dependence and Russia’s commitment to post-Soviet integration proved to be insufficient for turning the preconditions for regional leadership into reality. The war in Ukraine not only finally destroyed any chances of Russia becoming a regional leader, but also pushed the country toward geopolitical isolation.
