ABSTRACT
One of the darker realities of the war in Libya is that the conflict is powered by layers of actors from outside the contested territory. Beginning at the time of the anti-Qadhafi revolution in 2011, Libyans have been killed and their country ravaged by foreign soldiers of fortune. Yet the use of mercenaries is seen by ethicists as one of the worst moral failings in war. This paper explores how Libya became ground-zero for a mercenary-led model of proxy warfare, while state-level actors have made little effort to conceal their sponsorship of these activities. The paper examines the implications for international order of the mercenary build-up in Libya. It also explores how the normalisation of the use of mercenaries in Libya points to the ongoing weakening of a once robust international norm. Furthermore, the modern Libyan experience of mercenaries demonstrates their impact on the decision to begin fighting, respect for the laws of war during the fighting, judgements on whether to keep fighting, and the prospects for peace once the fighting ends. With Kremlin-linked private military contractors stationed under NATO's southern flank, the Libyan case also underscores the way in which mercenaries can represent an important geostrategic vector.
