ABSTRACT
It is common to note some emerging forms of dissent to make claims of civil disobedience. Against them, sceptics argue that these protests should be seen in their own right, and sometimes as instances of uncivil disobedience, because they neither meet the demanding requirements of civil disobedience nor adequately capture the nature of dissent. The chapter examines the sceptical claim against one emerging form of dissent, whistleblowing, and argues that it is a form of civil disobedience. Additionally, it argues that the sceptical claims rest on a conception of civility borrowed from the Rawlsian theory of civil disobedience that is demanding for forms of dissent that, though democracy-enhancing, need not demonstrate features similar to classic forms of civil disobedience. Whistleblowing challenges us to reconsider the shifting lines between civil and uncivil forms of disobedience and demands that theories of civil disobedience are sensitive to the changing contexts of political action. The deviance of whistleblowing from standard models is no testimony to a lack of sincerity and seriousness but a response to the demands of the specific situation, the changing nature and forms of political engagement and governance, and a regard for personal circumstances.
