ABSTRACT
Any serious integration of the thought of Emmanuel Levinas into psychology must begin by being serious about morality (Gantt, E. E., & Williams, R. N. (Eds) (2002a). Psychology for the other: Levinas, ethics and the practice of psychology. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.). If psychology is to appreciate Levinas and open itself to such an integration it must acknowledge and accept the essentially moral character of his work. (Here I am using ‘the moral’ and ‘the ethical’ interchangeably although I am aware of the difference that emerges in Levinas’ work. This distinction is important, but, I believe, best left until after the essential character of Levinas’ thought and its ability to open up psychology in a new way are articulated.) This essential morality derives in part from the unapologetic tone of Levinas’ writings; however, its roots are much deeper. The ethical is intrinsic to Levinas’ work, not just to his tone, and he gives us to understand that the ethical is, likewise, intrinsic to our nature. (The term ‘heteronomy’ in the title of this presentation conveys the sense that Levinas’ account of the ethical is not one that places the self, the ego, or the individual at the center of moral discourse. The self is not the source of ethical obligations or of moral behaviors. The important understanding of the ethical is the understanding of how the ethical arises from, and with, the other. Thus it is properly experienced as heteronomy.) This understanding is certainly what draws many to Levinas, but it also certainly leads many to question whether Levinas’ work can ever be successfully brought into contemporary academic or cultural discourse. It leads still others to protest the very idea. This essay will explore the fundamental nature of the ethical and the ethical nature of the fundamental and seek a point of entry for Levinas’ thought into psychology.
