ABSTRACT
Law reform commissions usually flourish in common law jurisdictions. Common law systems require judicial decisions to be consistent with one another as in stare decisis. This complex requirement can be eased or lessened by codification or by statutory intervention, which naturally calls for the involvement of law reform commissions who recommend appropriate legislative changes accordingly. Civil law systems do not have such a requirement of internal consistency. There is a convergence of the two systems but only a very small proportion of civil law cases are conducive to the common-law style law-making because civil law judges are both burdened and empowered with fact-finding. Civil law cases do not carry strong precedential force on future cases because judges dispose of the cases through fact-finding without exposing the legal standard by which the facts are decided. This means that the need for law reform commissions for cutting through or strengthening the web of the precedential force of myriad cases will remain unique to the common law system, not the civil law system. However, even in civil law systems, evidence for an independent need for law reform commissions is ample. Civil law systems require non-partisan recalibration of statutes as legislative activities become often too politicised and leave behind gaps. Such non-partisan efforts require the cooperation of the judiciary and the legislature. Parliamentary democracy where the separation of power is not so sharp seems more conducive to the creation of law reform commissions than presidential democracy.
