ABSTRACT
To what extent can our individual identity be described as habitual? In addressing this question, the present chapter draws on Merleau-Ponty and gathers some observations on the relevance and limitations of the term “habitual identity” (both personal and social). The impossibility to merge identity and habituality is due, among other reasons, to the fact that a person’s identity is co-determined by non-recurrent experiences that cannot be dealt with by relying on habitual behavior. The focus is on Merleau-Ponty’s account of three types of transformative experiences (loss, personal transformation, and decision). In his analysis of existence as largely transcending habituality, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes continuity. Therefore, in the conclusion, the chapter addresses the objection that Merleau-Ponty is an irredeemable continuist who lacks a sense for novelty and alterity. Contrary to this criticism, it is shown that Merleau-Ponty’s descriptive approach makes his ideas useful for analyzing the possible closures inherent in social identities. The reason for the criticism lies rather in Merleau-Ponty’s qualification of habituality as pre-reflexivity only, which leads him to neglect the possibility of developing habits of reflexivity and non-identity, and in the missing phenomenology of plurality and conflict.
