ABSTRACT
Habits make ideas real. Conversely, in the process of habituation, ideas gain existential weight. This chapter argues that there is an inherent tension between ideality and reality in Husserl’s account of habits. Accordingly, we can distinguish in the intentional structure of habits both a real and an ideal component, which interact with each other. The chapter proceeds as follows: It will briefly sketch why, phenomenologically, we should speak of habits in the plural, thereby addressing the tension between the “ideal” and “real” realms of habits. It then discusses this tension by examining two examples of ideal structures described by Husserl: personal habit as a structure of consistency, and attitude as an epistemic habit. In particular, it is argued that Husserl’s theory of science presupposes a correlative conception of the concept of habitus, and that such a correlation can be addressed in both its ideal and real components. In a further step, attention will be given to the inertia of habits as they passively restructure themselves. Bruce Begout’s deepening of Husserl’s account of habituation is used to describe the way in which habits become real forces. The chapter concludes by attempting to answer the following questions: What do habits do among themselves without our being aware of it? How and to what extent can we consciously integrate, coordinate, shape, or break habits? Do broken habits still live within us?
