ABSTRACT
This chapter aims to suggest how our contributors’ studies might be seen as fitting together, and some directions for further research. A non-bureaucratic structure of opportunities will likely encourage clientelism to the extent that formal and impersonal rules of advancement are liable to be absent. A bureaucratic structure may on the other hand, for this same reason, discourage clientelism. A multiplicity of other political roles characteristic of members of the political elite, however, might be expected to reduce the salience of clientelism in advancement. The relationship, therefore, between clientelism and role may be thought of as involving reciprocal influence rather than one shaping the other. Miller’s objective is to explain Soviet staffing procedures as directly attributable to the preferences of those in charge of such personnel links. Focusing on structure and role will yield more satisfactory explanations of advancement within the political elite than will clientelism, particularly for systems of the Soviet type.
