ABSTRACT
This chapter reviews key questions and empirical evidence about the relationship between power‐sharing institutions and post‐conflict trajectories in countries that have experienced civil war. Different measures and concepts of power‐sharing are discussed, and a broad set of empirical results is reviewed. The author identifies three types of power-sharing: (a) ‘inclusive’, which mandates the participation of several parties in decision‐making processes, (b) ‘dispersive’, dividing authority between individuals in a well‐defined pattern; and (c) constraining, limiting the power of any individual and protecting vulnerable groups against encroachment and abuse. The conditions favourable to different types of power‐sharing are considered, as well as their impact on the risk of war recurring and democratic stability. The author finds that only constraining power-sharing has a positive effect on democratic survival and that only inclusive power‐sharing produces positive outcomes for democratic stability. Dispersive agreements, such as regional autonomy, have no positive effects on democracy but may reduce the risk of a return to conflict. However, the more extensive the inclusion of former rebels in the power balance, the more it weakens the parties’ commitment to power-sharing.
