ABSTRACT
The relationship of the recent ‘practical turn’ in sociology to the earlier tradition of the philosophy of praxis is explicated and analyzed. The philosophy of praxis represented a series of loosely affiliated strands of heterodox Marxism that sought to develop Marx’s intuitions concerning the practical constitution of society and to critique those sources of domination and heteronomy that limited subjects’ autonomy. Although it was never developed into a coherent model, it is argued that the philosophy of praxis contended that the social is constituted by the intersection between the subject and history. Given its concern with the problem of social constitution, praxis philosophy often drew on aspects of phenomenology and it accentuated subjects’ capacity for objectification. It is shown how the philosophy of praxis influenced many of the initiatives that shaped the sociology of practice, including those of Bourdieu, Giddens and Habermas. This reconstruction then forms the basis for assessing how later sociological frameworks concerned with practice critically diverged from praxis philosophy and drew on aspects of other theoretical traditions, like linguistics. Finally, this analysis clarifies outstanding issues facing sociology’s practical turn, the significance of its pragmatist variant and the nature of the altered historical context and its political implications.
