ABSTRACT
This chapter pursues the question of whether and how terrorist groups are able to make fundamental changes to their strategic approaches. Hence, it deals with learning that is concerned with the ends of the struggle. Based on processes of self-reflective inquiry, such learning does not occur in isolation but is in a complex way influenced by processes on the macro- and meso-level. However, starting an inquiry into established routines is only the first necessary step for institutional reform – deliberations may be cut short and learning outcomes never be implemented. Applying the concept of ‘double-loop learning’ by organizational learning scholars Argyris and Schön to four cases of terrorist organizations which at a time debated or made actual changes to their original approach (ETA, Boko Haram, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and Gamaa Islamiya), reveals that a combination of internal and external factors influence the likelihood of an aborted or successful learning process.
