ABSTRACT
This chapter studies the strategic learning of different insurgent groups, focusing on adapting military approaches according to the conditions of the struggle. Based on the notion that different basic methods – guerrilla warfare or urban terrorism – are suitable for different circumstances which are mainly determined by the strength of the state that the rebels are facing, the author develops a typology of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ strategies. Based on feedback to their initial actions, insurgents have to learn to successfully adapt to the power of their adversary by drawing on universal principles of asymmetric conflict. In this process, all input levels are involved, as groups have to quickly reflect on their own mistakes on the micro level but can also draw on experiences of allied organizations on the meso- and role models from history on the macro level. The author draws on several case studies to demonstrate successful as well as failed strategic adaptation, revealing that learning is most difficult when there is mixed information concerning the strength of the state.
