ABSTRACT
Although it is too early to provide a comprehensive account of the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences across the globe, even preliminary and incomplete data tell us that Russia has coped with the pandemic much worse than most developed and developing countries. By the end of 2021, the pandemic-driven excess mortality rate in Russia exceeded one million citizens. This outcome resulted from the influence of numerous factors, including insufficient funding of the public health sector and the inefficient health policy of the Russian state. However, the key factors behind Russia’s very poor response to the pandemic are related to bad governance – a politico-economic order aimed at rent-seeking as the main goal and substantive purpose of governing the Russian state. This chapter is focused on the effects of mechanisms of bad governance in Russia, its institutions and its incentives, as well as of major policy decisions of Russia’s authorities, on the consequences of the pandemic for Russia and its citizens. Russia’s response to the pandemic may be summarised as an involution, which resulted from attempts to preserve the previous status quo by muddling through at any cost, including the cost in lives and health of Russian citizens.
