ABSTRACT
Drafted in the aftermath of World War II, the rigid Italian constitution has shown since the very beginning a positive approach to EU integration. Despite not including a “Europe” clause in its earlier version, the travaux préparatoires show a strong commitment towards European unity. This translated into the absence of constitutional obstacles to the smooth implementation of EU law and in the effort by national constitutional actors to adjust the constitutional requirements to the need for the legitimacy of EU law. This has been possible thanks to the enthusiastic political support that the Italian Republic has shown towards the EU over the first 40 years of its existence. Starting from the 1970s, the Italian Constitutional Court has represented the only constitutional actor expressing legitimacy concerns and consequently trying to act as a gatekeeper of the national constitutional order. More recently, Eurosceptic parties have increased their vote share, and the levels of trust in the EU of Italian citizens have lowered, which raises the question of the long-term implications of an “efficiency” constitutional strategy in the face of multi-level governance.
