ABSTRACT
The introductory chapter is intended to provide an overview of the main themes addressed in the book and introduce key terms and concepts pertaining to Chinese military strategy. It provides background and context for the study, including the theoretical framework of coercive operations as understood by Chinese strategists. Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has pursued a military strategy and operational doctrine of “active defense,” a defensive strategic orientation rooted in the assumption that the greatest danger to the PRC lies in conflict against a more powerful adversary attempting to invade or intervene in China’s internal affairs. Based on its perceived need to plan for a confrontation with superior enemy forces from a position of relative weakness, China has focused on preparing for and responding to outside aggression with the goal of overcoming its material and technological disadvantages through strategy. A core component of its strategy has been to deter such threats from emerging or to neutralize them when necessary through the limited or demonstrative use of force.
