ABSTRACT
Three decades of authoritarian, one-party control in Sudan between 1989 and 2019 has completely eroded all previous forms of state apparatus (both colonial and post-colonial). These were not only limited to civil service but also included the army through which the ruling group took power, mass media, and all state tools used in managing both power and public opinion. Since Sudan's independence in 1956 and throughout its various phases of authoritarianism and democracy, state control was by and large focused on the higher echelons of state management. During both colonial and post-colonial periods, the state apparatus was essentially managed by Northern Sudan's educated elites. The model later established by the Islamists was different, yet similar to, the Russian model whereby the state was monopolized by the ruling party. Following the overthrow of the “Islamist regime,” the transitional government undertook wide-ranging and meticulous efforts to eradicate state corruption and re-establish state control over resources. However, the challenges of re-claiming older forms of state management in Sudan were enormous, if at all feasible, without the fragmentation of the state. This chapter aims to present an alternative conceptual framework for understanding the processes that led to the erosion of the structural foundation of post-colonial Sudan and the emergence of, out of the wreckages of conflicts, new political and socio-economic terrains. This chapter's emphasis is on the challenges of regaining state control over the economy and in particular the “the deep state.” Furthermore, this chapter underlines the economic and financial challenges facing the economy both internally and externally, such as post-COVID-19 challenges.
