Conclusion

The DSR has already improved the connectivity of millions of people across the globe. More importantly, it is positioned to dramatically expand that impact. In 2021, almost half the world’s population was still not connected to the digital domain, just as the coronavirus pandemic was increasing the importance of such connectivity. Geopolitics has gone digital, and the DSR and the private-sector companies that instrumentalise it will find it increasingly difficult to shake off political associations. Since Xi signalled the end of Beijing’s ‘hide and bide’ approach to the outside world, the BRI has become the centrepiece of China’s drive to become a leading global power. The main political obstacle to Chinese tech companies’ outward expansion has been the US government. Malcomson’s broadly positive view of the impact of the DSR on recipients might appear to be inconsistent with our assessment that China’s tech assertiveness has not facilitated greater geopolitical influence for Beijing.