ABSTRACT
Partiality in belief presents a puzzle in the case of friendship: philosophers disagree about whether it is bad (epistemically or morally) to disbelieve your friends. On the one hand, most people intuitively see the appeal of trusting their friends more than others; on the other hand, careful inquiry seems to require forming beliefs in an impartial way based only on the evidence. This chapter argues that individuals can commit moral wrongs against their friends through the act of disbelief. Also, there is a way to explain this wrong without being committed to a dangerous sort of epistemic partiality toward one’s friends. The first section considers a literary example to clarify the instinct that disbelief can be harmful to friendship. Sections 2 and 3 consider and reject two views of epistemic partiality in friendship. This chapter concludes with its own account of how friendship can permissibly influence belief formation in certain situations without violating epistemic obligations.
