ABSTRACT
Is permission to favor myself or obligation to provide only for my children part of our common moral framework, or is such partiality an external constraint on what morality can demand of us? Arguments in support of the claim that morality includes partiality appeal to a realistic view of human motivation, to our obligations to those near and dear to us, to an obligation to honor our commitments, and to a plausible account of supererogation. Impartialists argue that moral and self-interested reasons constitute separate normative domains; that morality elevates the interests of others relative to one’s own interests, the logical outcome of which is to count the interests of all equally; and that morality represents an ideal that can motivate people even when they do not live up to its demands completely. If moral reasons are overriding and if we are not all irrational, then morality must make room for partiality. However, while partialists argue for their position using ultimate authority of moral reasons as a premise, impartialists can simply deny such authority. Acting immorally does not always appear to be irrational. Moral theories having a complex structure, as well as rights based theories, show some promise in reconciling partial and impartial concerns. But they will not specify to the satisfaction of all a single correct balance to be struck.
