ABSTRACT
When the Taliban seized power in Afghanistan on 15 August 2021, most countries closed down their diplomatic mission in Kabul and started evacuating their citizens out of Afghanistan. But China was one of the few notable exceptions. It was among the first nations to develop a diplomatic channel with the Taliban regime and declared that it was ready for a “friendly and cooperative” relationship with the regime—the groundwork for that prompt decision, however, was laid down much earlier. Over the years, China had maintained direct communication with the Taliban, and both sides have met on several occasions, bilaterally and internationally, underscoring China’s warming ties with the Islamist group. This paper begins by briefly looking at the history of China’s engagement with the Taliban and then focuses on Beijing’s major interests in Afghanistan. It then engages with the BRI and argues that the combination of geography and security has made Afghanistan a second-class actor concerning BRI as a result, integration of war-torn country into BRI has not featured in Beijing’s list of priorities so far. At the end, the chapter offers some projections about Sino-Taliban relations and observes that China is unlikely to commit itself to any substantial investment or playing any greater role in Afghanistan and rather stick to a waitand-watch policy.
