Logic

This chapter treats two parts of Kant’s logic – pure (formal) logic and applied logic. Regarding the former, I focus on Kant’s claim that logic seems “finished and complete” since Aristotle (completeness claim). Against the simplistic assumption that it is a mere factual claim about history of logic, I interpret it as primarily a philosophical claim about the nature of (formal) logic. Noting the challenges about the foundation of logic posed by K. L. Reinhold and J. G. Fichte, two of Kant’s contemporaries, I argue that he owed us a proof of the completeness claim. Although he did not explicitly offer any such proof, I suggest that his logic corpus contains materials for constructing one on his behalf. Regarding applied logic, I draw attention to a prima facie puzzle as to why Kant calls it “logic” at all, since its topics can apparently be delegated to anthropology and psychology. In response, I suggest that pure and applied logics may be unified under “logic” broadly construed, as a two-part “critique and canon” that examines the workings of human understanding in two ways – one in abstracto and the other in concreto – with respect to the contingent empirical conditions of the thinking subject.