ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses Kant’s account of biology, understood as the scientific study of a particular kind of beings, namely living beings. Section 1 defends the claim that their “special character” (KU 5: 369) consists in their unique capacity to self-organize. In section 2, I show that the problem they present for us, human beings, takes the form of an antinomy that opposes mechanical and teleological modes of explanation. After examining a number of interpretations of the antinomy, I turn to its resolution and question whether it is satisfactory. In the final section, I use Kant’s endorsement of epigenetic accounts of organic generation as an illustration of Kant’s view of the only legitimate use of teleology in biology. In conclusion, I suggest that many interpretative disagreements about Kant’s account ultimately come down to different conceptions of the analogy (or lack thereof) between organisms and artefacts.
